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CASE COMMENTS
Copyright-SoUND RECORDINGS-CALIFORNIA STATUTE PROHIBITING
MUSIC PIRACY IS A VALID EXERCISE OF RETAINED STATE POWERS AND
DOES NOT CONFLICT WITH FEDERAL COPYRIGHT PRoTEC'rON.-Gold.
stein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
Donald Goldstein and others were charged with violating California
penal code section 653h, which prohibits the unauthorized duplication
of sound recordings' for commercial purposes. 2 Defendants moved to
dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the California statute con-
flicted with the copyright clause of the United States Constitutions and
the federal Copyright Act,' which implements the clause by granting
owners of certain creative works exclusive rights for a specified period
to copy and sell their copyrighted material. 5 Upon denial of their
motion to dismiss, the defendants pleaded nolo contendere. On appeal
the Appellate Department of the Superior Court of California upheld
the validity of the statute. After granting certiorari the United States
Supreme Court, in a 54 decision, affirmed.6 The Court held first that
the copyright clause does not necessarily preclude states from granting
copyright protection. Secondly, the Court determined that the federal
Copyright Act did not preempt the California statute, at least as both
Act and statute existed at the time the master recordings at issue in
Goldstein had been fixed. The unauthorized duplication at issue had
1. For the purposes of this comment a "sound recording" is a material object on
which musical, spoken or other sounds are fixed and from which the sounds can be
reproduced, either directly or with the aid of a machine. See 17 U.S.C. § 26 (Supp. I,
1971), amending (1970) (originally enacted as Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140,
§ l(e), 85 Stat. 391). A sound recording should be distinguished from the original musical
composition (i.e., sheet music), copyrightable under 17 U.S.C. § 5(e) (1970), and from a
musical production of the original composition, protected by 17 U.S.C. § 101(e) (1970).
2. CAL. PENAL CODE § 653h (West 1970) provides in part:
(a) Every person is guilty of a misdemeanor who:
(1) Knowingly and willfully transfers . . . any sounds recorded on a phonograph
record, disc, wire, tape . . . with intent to sell or cause to be sold, or to use or
cause to be used for profit through public performance, such article on which such
sounds are so transferred, without the consent of the owner.
(2) Sells any such article with the knowledge that the sounds thereon have been so
transferred without the consent of the owner.
3. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. provides that Congress shall have the power "[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
4. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (1970), as amended, (Supp. I, 1971).
5. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1, 24 (1970).
6. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
7. The term "fixed" apparently refers to the process of reproducing sounds upon a
material object. See note I supra. Neither the Copyright Act nor the interpretive cases
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occurred prior to February 15, 1972, the effective date of the Sound
Recording Amendments of 1971.8 The Court therefore did not con-
sider whether the Amendments, which for the first time brought sound
recordings within the federal Act as copyrightable subject matter,9 pre-
clude states from protecting recordings fixed after that date.
The degree of protection afforded sound recordings by the federal
copyright system has long remained unclear. As early as 1908 the Su-
preme Court held that a player piano roll was not a copy of copyrighted
sheet music,10 since a machine was required to convert the perforations
into musical notes.1 Congress reversed this narrow holding by enacting
sections 101(e) and 1(e) of the Copyright Act of 1909, which provide for
civil remedies, including injunctions and mandatory royalties, for the
"unauthorized mechanical reproduction of musical works."' 2 Regard-
less of these provisions, and the broad wording of sections four and five
of the Act," courts generally have been unwilling to find in the Act any
effective copyright protection for sound recordings.
4
have provided a precise definition of the word. Subsequent to the fixing of these record-
ings, the Copyright Act was amended. See notes 8 & 9 and accompanying text infra.
8. Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391, amending 17 U.S.C. §§ 1,
5, 19, 20, 26, 101(e) (1970). These amendments are reflected in 17 U.S.C. §§ l(f), 5, 19, 20,
26, 101(e) (Supp. I, 1971).
9. See 17 U.S.C. §§ l(f), 5(n) (Supp. I, 1971), amending 17 U.S.C. §§ 1, 5 (1970).
10. White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
11. The Court described a "copy" as "'a written or printed record of [the original]
in intelligible notation.' " Id. at 17. The Court explained: "It may be true that in a
broad sense a mechanical instrument which produces a tune copies it; but this is a
strained and artificial meaning . . . .These musical tones are not a copy [of the sheet
music] which appeals to the eye." Id.
12. 17 U.S.C. § 101(e) (1970), as amended, (Supp. I, 1971); 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1970).
The original § 101(e), still effective for recordings fixed before February 15, 1972, provides
that when the owner of a copyrighted musical composition (i.e., sheet music) permits
others to make mechanical reproductions, any unauthorized reproduction or other in-
fringement can be enjoined and damages as specified in § 1(e) can be obtained, but no
criminal actions can be initiated. Section 1(e) provides the owner of a copyrighted musical
composition with the exclusive right to perform the composition publicly for profit and
to record it. However, once the owner has permitted a mechanical reproduction of the
composition, others may make similar use of the composition by paying the copyright
owner a royalty of two cents, trebled upon an original failure to pay, for each piece
manufactured. No such royalty payments are required if the owner has not filed notice to
record with the copyright office.
13. 17 U.S.C. § 4 (1970) provides that "all the writings of an author" may be copy.
righted. 17 U.S.C. § 5 (1970), as amended, (Supp. I, 1971), specifies fourteen classes of
works, including musical compositions (i.e., sheet music), but also states that the enumera-
tion of classes is not to be held to limit the scope of copyrightable writings.
14. In Goldstein the Court observed that although sound recordings can be included
as "writings" within the copyright clause, 412 US. at 561-62, the courts, with one early
exception, see Fonotipia, Ltd. v. Bradley, 171 F. 951, 963 (E.D.N.Y. 1909), have never held
that the statutory "writings" of 17 U.S.C. §§ 4, 5 (1970), as amended, (Supp. I, 1971), in-
clude sound recordings. 412 U.S. at 568. See also Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Record
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Like sound recordings, news content lacked copyright protection
under the 1909 Copyright Act. In 1918, however, the Supreme Court
found a means of protecting news copy in International News Service
v. Associated Press1 5 (INS). The Court created this protection by find-
ing a quasi-property right in news and by using a combination of the
doctrines of unfair competition and misappropriation to enjoin news
piracy.'1 Several state courts have applied the INS unfair competition
theory to protect uncopyrightable sound recordings. 7 Occasionally
courts have found a further source of state power in the states' retained
ability to protect common law rights in unpublished works.' More
Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 661 (2d Cir. 1955). 17 U.S.C. § 5(n) (Supp. I, 1971) now specifically
includes sound recordings as one class of copyrightable work.
The "copyright control" provided in the compulsory licensing provisions, 17 U.S.C.
§ 1(e) (1970); 17 U.S.C. § 101(e) (1970), as amended, (Supp. I, 1971), discussed in note 12
supra, is very narrow. Unlike an owner of writings, protected by §§ 4 and 5, the copyright
owner of a musical composition lacks the exclusive right to make copies of a recording of
his composition. Also, the owner's remedies are much more restrictive. Although the Act's
general remedy provision allows full damages, including lost profits, for copyright in-
fringement, see 17 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1970), the musical copyright owner's remedies are
limited to the minimal royalties and perhaps litigation costs. See Shapiro, Bernstein & Co.
v. Goody, 248 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1957).
This limitation upon damages is substantial. In the legitimate recording industry ap-
proximately 48% of the expenses are incurred for royalties, master recording costs and
advertising. Stark, The Great Tape Robbery, TAPE RECORDER GumE 1973 at 38-41 (Winter
ed.). Since a recording pirate can almost eliminate these expenses, he can sell the copy
for a much lower price. For example, in Capitol Records, Inc. v. Greatest Records, Inc.,
252 N.Y.S.2d 553 (Sup. Ct. 1964), the pirates were able to sell their copies for $2.99 while
the original recordings sold for $3.98. In fact, the provisions seem to benefit the pirates
more than the original recorders. See notes 64-67 and accompanying text infra.
15. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
16. Id. at 236, 240. Traditionally the common law doctrine of unfair competition pro-
hibited (1) the appropriation of the investment or skill of another, (2) by a competitor,
(3) through fraudulent deception among consumers as to the actual source of the prod-
ucts. See Goldstein, Federal System Ordering of the Copyright Interest, 69 COLUM. L. REV.
49, 57 (1969).Cf. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 711, 712 (938). In INS the Court treated
misrepresentation as a subcategory of unfair competition by eliminating the third re-
quirement:
[D]efendant's conduct differs from the ordinary case of unfair competition in trade
principally in this that, instead of selling its own goods as those of complainant, it
substitutes misappropriation in the place of misrepresentation, and sells com-
plainant's goods as its own.
248 U.S. at 242. In this comment the two doctrines are used interchangeably unless
otherwise noted.
17. See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Spies, 264 N.E.2d 874 (IIl. Ct. App. 1971);
Capitol Records, Inc. v. Greatest Records, Inc. 252 N.Y.S.2d 553 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Lib-
erty/UA, Inc. v. Eastern Tape Corp., 180 S.E.2d 414 (N.C. Ct. App. 1971); Waring v.
WDAS Broadcasting System, 194 A. 631 (Pa. 1937). See also M. NiMMER, CoPvGTrr § 35.22
(1973).
18. See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir.
1955); Capitol Records, Inc. v. Greatest Records, Inc., 252 N.Y.S.2d 553 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
Cf. Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup.
(Vol. 2
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recently states have enacted statutes imposing criminal sanctions for the
unauthorized sale or copying of sound recordings.19
Judge Learned Hand of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit led a strong movement against such state protection and
in favor of federal preemption of the entire copyright field.20 Hand re-
jected the INS unfair competition doctrine by limiting that case to its
facts. 21 In resisting attempts to base state protection on the states' re-
tained powers over unpublished works, Hand determined that any
"common law property" in musical performances ended, at the latest,
once recordings were sold,2 2 and that any subsequent protection could
only be obtained from Congress.22 Hand emphasized that only nation-
ally uniform laws could properly provide published writings with ef-
fective protection consistent with the "for limited Times" restriction in
the copyright clause.
24
In 1964 the Supreme Court seemed to indicate that Judge Hand's
preemption logic had prevailed over state attempts to provide local
remedies for patent and copyright infringement. In the companion
cases of Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co. 25 and Compco Corp. v.
Ct. 1950), afj'd, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (App. Div. 1951). These cases refer to publication as
"dedication to the public."
17 U.S.C. § 2 (1970) allows a state to provide an author with common law copyright
protection of his unpublished works. The owner of this copyright has the exclusive right
to first publication of his work for a potentially unlimited duration. However, once the
author has distributed his work to the public through a general publication, he forfeits
this state common law copyright protection. See generally RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman,
114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 712 (1940). Most courts have considered the
public sale or distribution of sound recordings to constitute a publication, and therefore
to fall outside the scope of § 2. See M. NiMMER, supra note 17, §§ 50.2, 50.3.
19. At least seventeen states have enacted such statutes. See Dunaj, Tape Piracy and
Applicable Florida Criminal Laws, 48 FA. B.J. 338, 341 n.12 (1974).
20. See Goldstein, supra note 16, at 51-53.
21. See RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86, 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S.
712 (1940).
22. Id. at 88.
23. Id. at 89.
24. See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 667 (2d Cir.
1955) (dissenting opinion). In this case the majority abandoned Hand's preemption posi-
tion. See id. at 662-63.
25. 376 U.S. 225 (1964). The Stiffel Company patented and manufactured a pole
lamp. Sears produced a substantially identical lamp which sold at a retail price equal to
the Stiffel wholesale price. The district court invalidated the Stiffel patents for want of
invention, but held that Sears had violated the Illinois unfair competition laws by manu-
facturing a lamp confusingly similar to the Stiffel design. The court of appeals affirmed.
Stiffel Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 115 (7th Cir. 1963). On certiorari, the Su-
preme Court reversed. The Court held that the federal patent laws prevent the states
from providing protection against copying articles unprotected by valid federal patents:
Just as a State cannot encroach upon the federal patent laws directly, it cannot,
under some other law, such as that forbidding unfair competition, give protection
FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. 2 the Court held that federal law had pre-
empted the patent field and that states could not use the doctrine of
unfair competition to provide protection even for mechanical devices
which are unpatentable under federal law .27 The Court, in dicta, in-
cluded copyright law within the scope of its consideration, and stated
that the strong federal policy of free competition demanded that the
statutory monopolies created by both patent and copyright law be
strictly limited to the bounds provided by Congress:
[W]hen an article is unprotected by a patent or a copyright, state law
may not forbid others to copy that article. To forbid copying would
interfere with the federal policy, found in Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, of the
Constitution and in the implementing federal statutes, of allowing
free access to copy whatever the federal patent and copyright laws
leave in the public domain.28
Despite this strong statement of the dominance of the federal policy
of free competition over retained state powers, courts frequently have
refused to apply the Sears-Compco preemption doctrine to restrict state
protection of sound recordings.29 Instead, the courts have created tenu-
ous distinctions between state efforts to prevent copying, which Sears-
Compco prohibited,30 and the INS unfair competition doctrine, which
still could be used to combat recording pirates.32
of a kind that clashes with the objectives of the federal patent laws.
376 U.S. at 231.
26. 376 U.S. 234 (1964). Day-Brite patented and manufactured a florescent lighting
fixture with unique diffusion qualities. Compco sold a substantially identical lighting
fixture. The district court invalidated the Day-Brite patents, but held that Compco had
violated the Illinois unfair competition laws by manufacturing fixtures confusingly similar
to the Day-Brite model. The court of appeals affirmed. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Compco
Corp., 311 F.2d 26 (7th Cir. 1962). On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed for policy
reasons substantially the same as those expressed in Sears. See note 25 supra.
27. 376 U.S. at 231-32. The Court noted that states can prevent imitating manufac-
turers from misleading purchasers as to the source of the goods, but cannot prevent the
actual copying of unpatented articles. Id. at 232-33.
28. 376 U.S. at 237. The Sears Court stated:
The purpose of Congress to have a national uniformity in patent and copyright laws
can be inferred from such statutes as that which vests exclusive jurisdiction to hear
patent and copyright cases in federal courts, 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a), and that section of
the Copyright Act which expressly saves state protection of unpublished writings
but does not include published writings, 17 U.S.C. § 2.
376 U.S. at 231 n.7.
29. See, e.g., Tape Head Co. v. RCA Corp., 452 F.2d 816 (10th Cir. 1971); Tape In-
dustries Ass'n of America v. Younger, 316 F. Supp. 340 (C.D. Cal. 1970), appeal dismissed,
401 U.S. 902 (1971); Capitol Records, Inc. v. Erickson, 82 Cal. Rptr. 798 (Ct. App. 1969);
Capitol Records, Inc. v. Spies, 264 N.E.2d 874 (I1. Ct. App. 1970); Liberty/UA, Inc. v.
Eastern Tape Corp., 180 S.E.2d 414 (N.C. Ct. App. 1971).
30. See notes 25 & 26 supra.
31. See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Greatest Records, Inc., 252 N.Y.S.2d 553 (Sup.
[Vol 2
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In Florida an attempt to impose such a distinction failed. In Inter-
national Tape Manufacturers Ass'n v. Gerstein 2 the Federal District
Court for the Southern District of Florida declared unconstitutional
section 543.041 of the Florida statutes, 8 an anti-piracy statute similar to
that involved in Goldstein.34 In examining the application of the stat-
ute to recordings fixed prior to February 15, 1972, the effective date of
the 1971 Sound Recordings Amendments to the 1909 Copyright Act,35
the court found that the Florida statute was a state unfair competition
law which offended both the Sears-Compco rationale and the federal
copyright scheme. 6 With regard to recordings fixed after February 15,
1972, the court found that the absence of a durational limitation3 7 and
the lack of a notice provision 3  in the Florida statute presented "gross
Ct. 1964); Liberty/UA, Inc. v. Eastern Tape Corp., 180 S.E.2d 414 (N.C. Ct. App. 1971);
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Custom Recording Co., 189 S.E.2d 305 (S.C. 1972).
One commentator explained that the courts were distinguishing between copying, the
process by which a substantially identical product is developed by an independent party,
and misappropriation, the production of an exact reproduction of the original without
the same initial investment as is required in making the original. See Note, The "Copying-
Misappropriation" Distinction: A False Step in the Development of the Sears-Compco
Pre-Emption Doctrine, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1444, 1461-63 (1972). See also M. NIMMER, supra
note 17, § 35.224; Goldstein, supra note 16, at 71-73.
32. 344 F. Supp. 38 (S.D. Fla. 1972), vacated and remanded, 494 F.2d 25 (5th Cir.
1974). The Fifth Circuit held that the record did not show that the plaintiff had been
prosecuted or threatened with prosecution. The court therefore remanded the case to
determine whether a ripe controversy existed.
33. FLA. STAT. § 543.041 (1973) states in part:
(2) It is unlawful:
(a) Knowingly and willfully and without the consent of the owner, to transfer or
cause to be transferred any sounds recorded on a phonograph record, disc, wire,
tape, ... with the intent to sell or cause to be sold for profit such article on which
sounds are so transferred.
(b) To sell any such article with the knowledge that the sounds thereon have been
so transferred without the consent of the owner.
34. See note 2 supra.
35. See notes 8 & 9 and accompanying text supra.
36. 344 F. Supp. at 53-54. It is significant that the court did not invalidate the
Florida statute by holding that Congress intended the federal copyright law to preempt
the field. The court said:
While conceding that Congress may not have preempted all state laws, common or
statutory, regulating the dissemination of sound recordings, it does not follow that
the absence of preemption validates each and every such state law. A state law
rendering criminal the unauthorized manufacture and sale of sound recordings
flies in the face of Sears and Compco, regardless of whether Congress has preempted
the field.
Id. at 52.
37. FLA. STAT. § 543.041 (1973) allows a potentially unlimited period of protection
for the work. Copyrighted work enters into the public domain after the termination of
the copyright period, and thus may be freely copied by anyone without suffering any
consequences for infringement. See 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1970).
38. FA. STAT. § 543.041 (1973) contains no notice or registration requirements, whereas
such requirements are very strict under the federal act. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 10, 13, 14, 19, 20,
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conflicts" with federal copyright law.39 The court declined to save the
state statute by restricting its application to the state's retained power
to protect common law copyright in unpublished works, 40 and held
that the sale and distribution of the original recordings constituted a
"general publication.1141
While restricting its inquiry to sound recordings fixed prior to
February 15, 1972,42 the Goldstein Court adopted an unexpectedly
permissive view of the states' ability to prevent the copying of ma-
terials unprotected by congressional copyright legislation.43 The Court
neither applied the Sears-Compco preemption doctrine to copyright nor
used the copying-unfair competition distinction to avoid the doctrine.
The Court relegated to a footnote the issue of whether "publication"
extinguishes the states' power to protect creative work, and observed
that the term "publication" has no application to certain categories of
writings, such as sound recordings, "which Congress has not brought
within the scope of the [Copyright Act]. "44 The Court then charted its
own course in determining the validity of the California statute.
The Court considered separately whether the statute violated either
the copyright clause45 or the supremacy clause.46 The majority found
that the "for limited Times" restriction of the copyright clause is a
limitation only upon Congress,47 and that the clause does not neces-
sarily exclude by implication the concurrent exercise of state power.4 8
30, 31 (1970). The court observed: "Under the state statute, an innocent copier could be
convicted of selling copies of a sound recording regardless of whether the master disc had
been copyrighted." 344 F. Supp. at 55.
39. 344 F. Supp. at 54. The court declined to infer that the Florida statute incorpo-
rated by reference federal copyright law. Id. at 55.
40. This protection is discussed in note 18 supra.
41. 344 F. Supp. at 57.
42. 412 U.S. at 552 n.7.
43. See The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARV. L. REv. 282 (1973). See also Gold-
stein, supra note 16, at 69.
44. 412 U.S. at 570 n.28. The Court reasoned that, for purposes of federal law, the
principle that a writer forfeits his copyright upon a "general publication" of his work
attaches only to "the legal relationships which Congress has adopted under the federal
copyright statutes." Since the sound recordings in Goldstein were not protected by any
federal copyright statute, the question of whether those recordings had been "published"
under California law was irrelevant. Id. For earlier treatment of the publication issue,
see notes 18, 22 & 23 and accompanying text supra.
45. The text of U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, is provided in note 3 supra.
46. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
47. 412 Us. at 560.
48. Id. at 554. The Court emphasized that use of the federal preemption argument to
void all state copyright protection would depart from the rule of constitutional con-
struction that powers granted to the federal government are concurrent unless granted
in exclusive terms by the provision, or unless their exercise by a state would invariably
conflict with the exercise of the federal power. Id. at 552-53.
[Vol. 2
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The Court then concluded that Congress had intended the 1909 Copy-
right Act only to expand federal law, and not to delimit the permissible
powers of states;4 1 thus the supremacy clause did not require the void-
ing of the California statute. Sears and Compco were limited to the
field of patent law,50 and their preemption doctrine was discussed in
terms of balance: with "regard to mechanical configurations, Congress
had balanced the need to encourage innovation and originality of in-
vention against the need to insure competition in the sale of identical
or substantially identical products." 51 With regard to sound recordings,
however, "Congress has drawn no balance; rather, it has left the area
unattended, and no reason exists why the State should not be free to
act."5 2
The Court's separate consideration of the copyright and supremacy
clauses contrasts sharply with the more unified treatment of those
clauses in Sears and Compco. Arguably, those decisions imposed a
necessary constitutional restriction upon state powers in addition to
congressional legislation. 53 Thus, the policy underlying the constitu-
tional mandate of "for limited Times" would prevent the states from
granting perpetual monopolies to creative ideas because of the balance
implicit in the patent and copyright clause between the protection of
these ideas and the necessity of ensuring a competitive economy. 5"
However, Goldstein indicates that this balance can be struck only once
Congress has acted. Thus the Court is required to interpret the mean-
ing of congressional inaction, which could as well indicate a congres-
sional intention to keep sound recordings completely free of copyright
protection as a congressional permissiveness toward state legislation. 55
Had the Court instead considered only the California statute, it might
have avoided such speculation and found the statute to afford greater
49. Id. at 565-66.
50. Id. at 569.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 570.
53. Dissenting in Goldstein, Justice Douglas observed: "Sears and Compco make clear
that the federal policy expressed in Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, is to have 'national uniformity in
patent and copyright laws,' . . . a policy bolstered by Acts of Congress ...." 412 U.S. at
573. Perhaps a more accurate assessment of those cases is that they considered the clause
and statutes together to comprise a single "federal policy ...of allowing free access to
copy whatever the federal patent and copyright laws leave in the public domain." 376 U.S.
at 237.
54. See Kurtlantzick, The Constitutionality of State Law Protection of Sound Record-
ings, 5 CONN. L. Rxv. 204, 222-28 (1972). Cf. Goldstein, The Competitive Mandate: From
Sears to Lear, 59 CALIF. L. REv. 873, 875, 878-79 (1971). See also Capitol Records, Inc. v.
Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 667 (2d Cir. 1955) (Hand, J., dissenting).
55. See The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HAgv. L. Rav. 282, 287 & n.39 (1973).
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protection than the "limited Times" language of the copyright clause
allows.
56
Perhaps Goldstein can be limited to its narrow holding: for sound
recordings fixed before February 15, 1972, statutes identical to Cali-
fornia penal code section 653h57 do not conflict with federal copyright
protection. However, the Court's novel treatment of copyright law as
a whole leaves several important problems in its wake. The most ob-
vious of these is whether states can constitutionally protect sound re-
cordings fixed after February 15, 1972. Responding to this specific is-
sue, the court in International Tape invalidated a Florida statute sim-
ilar to the California anti-piracy law because the court found an ex-
tensive conflict between the statute and the federal Sound Recording
Amendments.5 8 Language in Goldstein suggests that the Supreme Court
could reach a similar result.5 9 That result seems compelled by Congress'
stated purpose in enacting the Amendments, to create "a limited copy-
right in sound recordings. " 60 Presumably, Congress' decision to pro-
vide sound recordings with copyright clause protection will necessitate
balancing the encouragement of innovation against the assurance of
56. Even after the Court found that Sears and Compco did not require total pre-
emption of state law, the Court still could have found that CAL. PENAL CODE § 653h
(West 1970) provided the equivalent of copyright protection of unlimited duration, in
violation of the "for limited Times" restriction of the copyright clause as well as the
durational limitations for copyrighted works in the federal Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 24 (1970); cf. note 37 supra.
57. The text of CAL. PENAL CODE § 653h (West 1970) is provided in part in note 2
supra.
58. 344 F. Supp. at 53-54; see notes 37-39 and accompanying text supra. Florida has
considered eliminating this possible conflict. During its 1974 session the Florida Legislature
proposed several major changes to FLA. STAT. § 543.041 (1973). See Fla. H.R. 3056 (1974).
The proposed changes would have exempted from coverage under the statute all copying
operations which comply with federal copyright law. Compliance would ensure that such
copying would not constitute an unfair or deceptive trade practice. Fla. H.R. 3056, § 2
(1974). The legislature did not act on this bill during the 1974 session.
In International Tape the court expressed doubt that incorporation by reference of
federal law would save the state law. 344 F. Supp. at 55. If the federal law is construed
to preempt state regulation completely, such a savings provision would seem at the very
least to render the proposed Florida statute meaningless.
59. For example, the Court concluded its opinion by emphasizing that its decision
does not take into account the Sound Recording Amendments of 1971. The Court stated:
[O]ur decisions in Sears and Compco, which we reaffirm today, have no application
in the present case, since Congress has indicated neither that it wishes to protect,
nor to free from protection, recordings of musical performances fixed prior to
February 15, 1972.
412 U.S. at 571. Since Congress has indicated it wishes to protect recordings subsequent
to that date, presumably the dicta in Sears and Compco applying its preemption doctrine
to copyrights would now be applicable. The most recent analysis of these decisions by the
Court indicates a further weakening of them. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 94
S. Ct. 1879 (1974).
60. H.R. REP. No. 487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1971).
[Vol 2
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competition in order to assess the degree of state protection that will be
tolerated.61
Even assuming that the 1971 Amendments totally preempt state
legislation concerning sound recordings fixed after February 15, 1972, a
substantial number of recordings-those fixed before that date-remain
unprotected by federal law. Recording companies conceivably could
decrease this number drastically by reissuing older recordings and then
claiming they had been fixed after February 15, 1972. An attempt to
gain federal protection for sound recordings originally excluded from
the Amendments, however, would seem to conflict with Congress' inten-
tional limitation of the Amendments to an experimental three-year
period before considering permanent legislation.
62
The Court has not specified what degree of protection is available
for recordings in states lacking an anti-piracy law similar to the Cali-
fornia statute. Even so, dicta in Goldstein indicating approval of INS
suggest that such states may still be able to fashion protection from
unfair competition principles." Already courts have found authority in
Goldstein for allowing unfair competition remedies.64 In other jurisdic-
tions, however, the pirates themselves have taken the offensive. The
1909 Copyright Act gave persons the right to record the recording of a
copyright owner's original musical composition once the recorder paid
the owner a two-cent royalty per record and once both parties complied
with certain notice requirements." Several courts have allowed pirates
to make legal copies of sound recordings fixed before February 15,
1972, simply by following these compulsory-royalty provisions.66 Al-
61. See notes 51 & 52 and accompanying text supra.
62. The Sound Recording Amendments of 1971 limited protection to those recordings
fixed between February 15, 1972, and January 1, 1975, in order that the effect of this
protection might be assessed before enactment of a more permanent amendment of the
Copyright Act of 1909. See H.R. REP. No. 487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1971). To allow the
recording companies merely to reissue older recordings during this period for the sole
purpose of obtaining federal copyright protection would seem to be outside the scope of
the original intent of Congress. See generally 58 MINN. L. REv. 316, 321 (1973).
63. The Goldstein Court indicated that the California statute did not restrain the
use of an idea or concept, since other parties could record the same composition "from
scratch." However, the statute gave the recordings themselves "attributes of property." 412
U.S. at 571. This reading is very similar to the finding by the INS Court of a quasi-prop-
erty right in the process of gathering news, which could be protected by the common law
doctrine of unfair competition even though news content itself was uncopyrightable. See
248 U.S. at 234, 236-40.
64. See Jondora Music Publishing Co. v. Melody Recordings, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 494
(D.N.J. 1973) (dictum); United Artists Records, Inc. v. Eastern Tape Corp., 198 S.E.2d 452
(N.C. Ct. App. 1973).
65. See 17 U.S.C. § l(e) (1970); 17 U.S.C. § 101(e) (1970), as amended, (Supp. I, 1971),
discussed in note 12 supra. See also M. NIMMER, supra note 17, § 108.
66. See, e.g., Jondora Music Publishing Co. v. Melody Recordings, Inc., 351 F. Supp.
572 (D.N.J. 1972) (memorandum opinion), 362 F. Supp. 488 (D.N.J.) (opinion), 362
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though this approach has met resistance, 7 until the issue is settled
pirates may have found a gaping hole in the wall of protection afforded
the legitimate recording industry. Nonetheless, one post-Goldstein court
has indicated that this absence of protection will effect only federal,
not state law remedies.6S
Finally, the effectiveness of any state protection of pre-February 15,
1972, sound recordings authorized by Goldstein remains in doubt. One
author concludes that since that date state regulation has been ineffec-
tive.69 The tape pirates appear to be using their mobility and their
marketing organizations to evade state protective legislation. For ex-
ample, many tape copying operations have located in New Jersey, with
no anti-piracy statute and in close proximity to the mass-markets of
New York and Pennsylvania, which do have state legislation protecting
sound recordings. 70 Attacks upon the copying operators under New
Jersey unfair competition laws have generally failed.71 Enforcing the
Pennsylvania and New York statutes against the tape retailers is dif-
ficult because of the large number of separate retail outlets involved in
the mass merchandizing of the pirated recordings. Other manufacturers
use the United States Postal Service to sell pirated recordings directly
to consumers residing in states having protective legislation. These
manufacturers establish copying operations in states with no protective
legislation and then advertise their pre-February 15, 1972, sound re-
cordings in national publications. Since the actual sale takes place at
the manufacturer's offices, the state statutes prohibiting sales within the
state of destination may be ineffective.7 2
F. Supp. 494 (D.N.J. 1973) (memorandum and order); Marks Music Corp. v. Colorado
Magnetics, Inc., 357 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Okla. 1973). For support of this position, see
M. NIMMER, supra note 17, § 108.4621. See also H.R. REP. No. 487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2
(1971).
67. See, e.g., Dutchess Music Corp. v. Stern, 458 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 847 (1972); Fame Publishing Co. v. S&S Distributors, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 984
(N.D. Ala. 1973).
68. See Jondora Music Publishing Co. v. Melody Recordings, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 488,
493 (D.N.J. 1973).
69. Hiemenz, Recording Pirates, Smxo, Spring 1974, at 25, 26-27.
70. See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 561 (McKinney 1968); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4116
(1973).
71. Hiemenz, supra note 69, at 27. See also Jondora Music Publishing Co. v. Melody
Recordings, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 572 (D.N.J. 1972) (memorandum opinion), 362 F. Supp.
488 (D.N.J.) (opinion), 362 F. Supp. 494 (D.N.J. 1973) (memorandum and order);
Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Melody Recordings, Inc., 306 A.2d 493 (N.J. Super. Ct.
1973) (pre-Goldstein).
72. The shipment of pirated sound recordings in interstate commerce is not ex-
pressly classified as a federal crime. However, if the pirated recording is misrepresented
by its label to be a product of the legitimate recording company which produces the
same recording, the recording then is termed counterfeit. 18 U.S.C. § 2318 (1970) makes
the shipment of counterfeit tapes in interstate commerce a federal crime. See United States
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Despite these difficulties, states have at least attempted to solve a
serious economic problem7 3 which Congress, until recently, has ignored.
In an area so strongly affected by mass communications and mass mer-
chandizing, however, it is inconceivable that any protection can be
either effective or appropriate without the national uniformity that
only Congress can impose. Considering the legal and practical problems
of state sound protection, as well as current congressional consideration
of comprehensive revisions of the Copyright Act of 1909,74 perhaps the
Goldstein Court would have been wiser to have invalidated the state
protective legislation and to have left the consideration of any future
protection to Congress. In 1908 the Supreme Court 5 used similar
tactics to prod Congress into passing the Copyright Act of 1909.8 While
the legitimate recording industry would not receive immediate relief
from their predatory competitors, the long-term effect of strong federal
copyright protection for sound recordings could far outweigh any ad-
verse short-term consequences.
Estate Tax-DEDUCTIONS-POST-DEATH EVENTS RELEVANT TO DE-
DUCTIBILITY OF CLAIMS AGAINST THE ESTATE PURSUANT TO SECTION
2053 (a) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CoDE.-Estate of Hagmann, 60 T.C.
No. 51 (1973), af'd, 492 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1974).
Frank G. Hagmann died on November 8, 1965, owing $54,360 to
various creditors. None of the creditors, however, filed claims against
Hagmann's estate pursuant to the Florida nonclaim statute.'
v. Shultz, 482 F.2d 1179 (6th Cir. 1973). The recordings at issue in Goldstein were
merely pirated recordings since there was no misrepresentation of their source. 412 U.S. at
549-50 n.4.
73. The House Judiciary Committee, reporting on the Sound Recording Amendments
of 1971, stated that the estimated volume of recording piracy exceeded $100 million per
year. See H.R. REP. No. 487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1971).
74. See Copyright Law Revision Bill, S. 1361, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
75. See White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
76. See notes 10-12 and accompanying text supra.
1. FLA. STAT. § 733.16 (1973), as amended, Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-106, § 1. At the
time Hagmann's estate was administered, § 733.16 provided in pertinent part:
(1) No claim or demand, whether due or not, direct or contingent, liquidated
or unliquidated . . . shall be valid or binding upon an estate . . . unless the
same shall be in writing . . . and be filed in the office of the county judge granting
1974)
